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Abstract—Limited resources (such as energy, computing power, 
storage, and so on) make it impractical for wireless sensor 
networks (WSNs) to deploy traditional security schemes. In this 
paper, a hierarchical key management scheme is proposed on 
the basis of identity-based encryption (IBE).This proposed 
scheme not only converts the distributed flat architecture of the 
WSNs to a hierarchical architecture for better network 
management but also ensures the independence and security of 
the sub-networks. This paper firstly reviews the identity-based 
encryption, particularly, the Boneh-Franklin algorithm. Then a 
novel hierarchical key management scheme based on the basic 
Boneh-Franklin and Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithms is 
proposed. At last, the security and efficiency of our scheme is 
discussed by comparing with other identity-based schemes for 
flat architecture of WSNs. 
Keywords- WSNs; key management; IBE; Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
     As one of the key technology in Internet of things (loT), 
wireless sensor networks has been widely used in military 
reconnoiter, city management, as well as environment and 
traffic detection. However, since sensor nodes and 
communication links in WSNs is open and unguarded, any 
potential adversary is likely to eavesdrop or fabricate the 
information being transmitted. Therefore, how to ensure 
network security and information authenticity is a technique 
that directly influences whether WSNs can be widely applied. 
     Traditionally, WSNs have two kind of network 
architecture: the distributed flat architecture and the 
hierarchical architecture [1]. In a hierarchical architecture of 
WSNs, nodes can be divided into two kinds: the cluster heads 
and sensor nodes. Cluster heads are superior to sensor nodes 
in terms of computational ability, storage, and battery power. 
In a distributed flat architecture of WSNs, every nodes is 
entitled the same status with same resources. However, 
because the WSNs that are deployed hierarchical architecture 
must ensure the designated cluster heads to be in the mist of 
the networks to avoid unattended nodes, the application of 
hierarchical architecture WSNs is greatly limited in practice. 
In many application areas such as the battlefield, harsh natural 
environment, distributed flat architecture is widely used in 
WSNs. 
In order to ensure the security of distributed flat 
architectural WSNs, researchers have been investigating a 
variety of security schemes. All these security schemes can be 
divided into two types: symmetric cryptography or 
asymmetric cryptography. 
Compared to asymmetric cryptography, symmetric 
cryptography requires far less computation. Therefore, 
symmetric cryptography has attracted much attentions and 
many schemes has been proposed. Eschenauer and Gligor has 
proposed a scheme based on probability for pre-distribution of 
keys [2]. Based on their scheme, Pietro develops a random key 
distribution scheme [3]. 
However, in order for symmetry cryptography to be 
deployed in WSNs, a pre-distribution process of keys must be 
finished and each node must store symmetry keys before the 
entire network is deployed, which would cause a big trouble 
for nodes addition or revocation. Thereby, researchers has 
been trying to deploy asymmetry cryptography in WSNs. 
Identity-based Encryption (IBE) [4], proposed in 1984 by 
Shamir, has been attached great importance because of its 
advantages in discernable pubic keys, not requiring PKI to 
distribute certificates and low computation overhead. 
Yang proposed a session key agreement scheme suitable 
for WSNs based on IBE and Diffie-Hellman key exchange [5]. 
In his scheme, key distribution and negotiation only happen in 
the initialization process of the networks, and once session 
keys have been established, information will be encrypted by 
symmetry cryptography, which requires less computation 
overhead. Due to its simplicity, this scheme is applicable to 
distributed flat architecture WSNs. Inspired by this scheme, 
Guo makes some improvement on Yang’s scheme in terms of 
energy consumption and computation overhead by using the 
identity-based signature to replace the identity-based 
encryption [6]. Nevertheless, both scheme fails to realize the 
authentication of nodes, and because each nodes in the 
network has to negotiate session keys with all neighborhood 
nodes, the communication and computation overhead is 
considerable. Qin designed a scheme for hierarchical 
architecture WSNs [7], which entitles sensor nodes to play the 
role of cluster heads, but this scheme is only aimed for 
hierarchical architectural WSNs and the computation 
overhead is intolerable for ordinary nodes since every 
communication process requires the encryption by IBE and 
symmetric cryptography. 
In this paper, we propose a hierarchical key management 
scheme based on IBE and DH key exchange. This scheme can 
greatly decrease the frequency of key negotiation and thus 
decrease the communication overhead by converting the 
distributed flat architecture to hierarchical architecture. The 
information will be encrypted by symmetry encryption rather 
than complex IBE, and hence subtly avoid the computation 
overhead brought by IBE.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section II 
describes the fundamental properties of identity-based 
encryption and its mathematical basis. Section III proposes a 
hierarchical key management scheme based on IBE and DH 
key exchange. Section IV & V give a detailed analysis of the 
scheme in terms of security and performance. The paper ends 
in section V with some conclusions and the expectation for 
future works. 
II. IDENTITY-BASED ENCRYPTION 
Identity-based encryption forsakes obtaining public key 
from certificate of the PKI, which is used in traditional 
asymmetric cryptography algorithm. In IBE, a string related 
to user’s identity is used as the public key of the user. 
Considering the computation overhead and security, this 
paper selected the identity-based encryption algorithm 
proposed by Boneh and Franklin [8]. The following parts of 
this section would introduce this IBE algorithm and relevant 
mathematic background. 
A. Secutity Model 
      The security of the algorithm proposed in [8] lies on the 
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) problems. The core of this 
algorithm is to create a Weil pairing in supersingular elliptic 
curve. The BDH problem and Weil pairing will be described 
in the following. 
1) BDH problem 
For random numbers a, b, c ∈ 𝑍𝑃
∗ , compute 
?̂?(𝑃, 𝑃)𝑎𝑏𝑐(𝐺𝐹(𝑝2)) on the assumption that (a, aP, bP, cP) 
is known, and ?̂?：G × G → GF(𝑝2) is a mapping that has the 
following proprieties:  
a) Bilinear. If for all 𝑥, 𝑦 ∈ 𝐺，𝑎, 𝑏 ∈ 𝑍, there will be 
?̂?(𝑥𝑎, 𝑦𝑏) = ?̂?(𝑥, 𝑦)𝑎𝑏, we can regard the map ?̂? as bilinear. 
b) Nondegenerate. There exists a pair of P, Q∈ 𝐺  to 
make ?̂?(𝑃, 𝑄) ≠ 1. 
c) Computable. For any P, Q∈ 𝐺 , there is a effective 
algorithm to compute ?̂?(𝑃, 𝑄). 
2) Weil pairing 
       The definition of Weil pairing is described as following: 
assume the order of cyclic group G is q, and there is an 
equation gcd(m, q) = 1, then the Weil pairing with order m 
is a mapping that fulfills following requirements: 
𝑒𝑚: {
𝐸[𝑚] × 𝐸[𝑚] → 𝐹𝑞
𝑘∗
(𝑃, 𝑄) → 𝑓𝐴(𝐵)/𝑓𝐵(𝐴)
， 
In this mapping, P，Q∈ E[m], A ~ (P) ~ (O), B ~ (Q) – 
(O), (𝑓𝐴) = mA, (𝑓𝐵) = mB. 
B. Basic Boneh-Franklin IBE algorithm 
      The Basic Boneh-Franklin IBE algorithm is comprised of 
four subsystems: setup, extract, encrypt and decrypt. These 
four subsystems will be introduced on the assumption that 
plaintext space M = {0,1}𝑛, cipher space C = 𝐺1 × {0,1}
𝑛. 
1) Setup.  
a) Private Key Generator (PKG) chooses a 
supersingular elliptic curve that fulfills WDH security 
assumption and a large prime p that is k bits long. Then PKG 
generates a subgroup G with order q in 𝐸/𝐺𝐹(𝑝) , G’s 
generator P, as well as a bilinear mapping ?̂?：𝐺 × 𝐺 →
𝐺𝐹(𝑝2). 
b) PKG picks a random master key s ∈ 𝑍𝑞
∗  , and 
computes 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑠𝑃. 
c) Select two hash function 𝐻1: {0,1}
∗ → 𝐸/𝐺𝐹(𝑃)，
𝐻2: 𝐺𝐹(𝑝
2) → {0,1}𝑛 . Construct the output public 
parameter  𝜋 = {𝑞, 𝑝, ?̂?, 𝑛, 𝑃, 𝑃𝑠𝑢𝑏 , 𝐻1, 𝐻2} , master key s is 
kept only by PKG. 
2) Extract 
     For a given string Id ∈ {0,1}∗, compute 𝑄𝐼𝑑 = 𝐻1(𝐼𝑑) ∈
𝐸/𝐺𝐹(𝑝) , and compute 𝐾𝐼𝑑 = (𝑄𝐼𝑑)
𝑠  as private key for 
corresponding user. 
3) Encryption 
For a plaintext m ∈ M, and its Id, the method to encrypt it 
is to: first, compute 𝑄𝐼𝑑 = 𝐻1(𝐼𝑑) ∈ 𝐺𝐹(𝑝); second, choose 
a random number r ∈ 𝑍𝑞
∗; third, construct ciphered text C =<
rP, m ⊕ 𝐻2(𝑔𝐼𝑑
𝑟 ) > , among which  𝑔𝐼𝑑 = ?̂?(𝑄𝐼𝑑 , 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏) ∈
𝐺𝐹(𝑝2). 
4) Decryption 
Assuming that the ciphered text C =< U, V >, apply the 
private key 𝐾𝐼𝑑(𝐸/𝐺𝐹(𝑝))  to compute the plaintext  m =
V ⊕ 𝐻2(?̂?(𝐾𝐼𝑑, 𝑈)). 
III. A HIERARCHICAL KEY MANAGEMENT SCHEME FOR 
DISTRIBUTED FLAT ARCHITECTURAL WSNS 
     Based on Basic Boneh Franklin algorithm, we propose a 
hierarchical key management scheme. The core of this 
scheme is to manage the distributed flat architecture WSNs 
in a hierarchical way. The major technique used in this 
scheme is to allow some sensor nodes to serve as cluster 
heads routinely and dynamically. Other sensor nodes 
negotiate symmetry keys with cluster heads by applying IBE 
algorithm and Diffie-Hellman key exchange. In addition, 
nodes no longer use IBE algorithm to encrypt message since 
the computation overhead is intolerable for nodes with 
limited recourses, instead, they use symmetric cryptography 
to encrypt the message to be sent. The following parts of this 
section introduce our scheme in terms of network model, 
network initialization, key negotiation, node addition and 
revocation. 
A. Network model 
      As said before, this scheme is aimed for distributed flat 
architectural WSNs, and achieves a hierarchical management 
through the dynamic allocation of cluster heads. By default, a 
base station is in the center of the network and all other nodes 
are randomly distributed and accessible by the base station. 
Considering the geographical distribution of nodes, the base 
station chooses N sensor nodes to be cluster heads, which 
forms N sub-networks. The cluster heads chosen by base 
station delimit their territories and broadcast their identities to 
sensor nodes within their territories. The sensor node in a 
specific territory communicate only with its cluster head. The 
cluster heads transmit information received from sensor nodes 
to base station and make a rudimentary information fusion. If 
the base station is accessible to cluster heads, cluster heads 
transmit messages directly to base station, if not, cluster heads 
make a multi-hop transmission via reply nodes. The network 
architecture is illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1.  A hierarchical architecture for distribute flat WSNs. 
B. Network initialization 
During the manufacture period of sensor nodes, the setup 
function of IBE is executed and all sensor nodes store the 
public parameter π. Master key s is only accessible to the 
owner of the network or the base station. For example, if a 
troop wants to deploy a WSN in a battlefield, the public 
parameter π should be embedded in the ROM of every nodes 
during the manufacture period. However, the master key 
should be preserved by the troop or the base station owned 
by this troop. If new sensor nodes need to be added to the 
network, we must make sure that the parameters embedded 
in the new sensor nodes are identical to that of the deployed 
nodes. In addition, before nodes are put into use, a unique Id 
number should be allocated to every nodes and the private 
key 𝐾𝐼𝑑 corresponding to Id number should be generated and 
allocated to nodes by calling the extract function of IBE. 
After the network is deployed, the base station chooses N 
sensor nodes to be cluster heads and thus N sub-networks is 
formed. Once the nodes chosen know about their identity as 
cluster heads, they negotiate secret keys with base station. 
Meanwhile, cluster heads broadcast their Ids to neighborhood 
sensor nodes and negotiate secret keys with sensor nodes 
within their territories. The detailed process of key 
negotiation between cluster heads and base station or sensor 
nodes is discussed in part C, section III. 
After the negotiation of keys between sensor nodes and 
cluster heads is finished, a cluster head knows the Id of every 
sensor nodes in its territory and acquires communication keys 
with every associated nodes. Then a cluster head choose a 
random number 𝑠𝑖 ∈ 𝑍𝑞
∗(𝑖 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑁)  as a master key 
and serve as PKG in its territory. The cluster head uses the 
master key 𝑠𝑖 and each node’s Id to generate new private keys 
for every nodes in its territory, then 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 = 𝑠𝑃  will be 
calculated. The newly calculated private key 𝐾𝐼𝑑  and 
𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 are updated in cluster heads. Besides, each node would 
receive encrypted  𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏  and 𝐾𝐼𝑑  that are corresponding to 
their Ids from cluster heads. After receiving the message, 
each node decrypts it and update their private key and public 
parameter.  
Therefore, the entire network is divided into N separate 
and independent sub-networks through the function of cluster 
heads. In each sub-network, a cluster head serves as PKG and 
can carry on the key distribution and negotiation process 
independently. Since the master key 𝑠𝑖  is randomly chosen 
by each cluster head, every two sub-networks are irrelevant. 
Granted that the adversary has made a breakthrough in one 
sub-network, other sub-networks are still secure. 
C. Key negotiation 
The key negotiation process consists of three steps: 
broadcast, parameter calculation, parameter exchange. The 
calculation of symmetry keys is proceeded using Diffie-
Hellman key exchange algorithm [9]. The entire negotiation 
process is illustrated in figure 2. 
1) Broadcast 
     Once a cluster head (denoted as A) knows its identity, it 
broadcasts its identification Id𝐴  to base station and sensor 
nodes in its territory (denoted as B). 
2) Parameter calculation  
     A cluster head (A) chooses  𝑋𝐴 < 𝑞 , and calculates 
parameter 𝑌𝐴 = 𝜂
𝑋𝐴  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞. 
     A base station or sensor node (B) chooses 𝑋𝐵 < 𝑞, and 
calculates parameter 𝑌𝐵 = 𝜂
𝑋𝐵  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞. 
3) Parameter exchange 
a) A base station or sensor node uses the encrypt 
function of IBE algorithm to encrypt 𝑌𝐵 and 𝐼𝑑𝐵. The public 
key used for encryption is the identity of the cluster head: 𝐼𝑑𝐴, 
which is broadcasted by the cluster head. 
b) Once the cluster head receives the encrypted message, 
it uses its private key 𝐾𝐼𝑑𝐴  to decrypt the message and get 
𝑌𝐵  and 𝐼𝑑𝐵 from the decrypted message. 
c) Correspondingly, the cluster head uses the encrypt 
function of IBE algorithm to encrypt 𝑌𝐴. The public key used 
for encryption is the identity of the node or base station: 𝐼𝑑𝐵 . 
Then the cluster head sends the encrpypted message to the 
corresponding receiver, that is the node or base station which 
owns the private key of the corresponding public key. 
d) The cluster head calculates and stores the symmetric 
key 𝐾 = (𝑌𝐵)
𝑋𝐴  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞 , the base station or sensor node 
calculates and stores the key 𝐾 = (𝑌𝐴)
𝑋𝐵  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑞, too. 
4) Encryption and Decryption process 
Communication parties use the symmetry key K as the 
secret key to encrypt or decrypt message, using symmetry 
cryptography algorithm such as AES or DES. After a certain 
period of time, in order to ensure the security of the network, 
each sub-network proceeds independent key distribution and 
negotiation process. During this process, the public 
parameter and private keys used for key distribution or 
negotiation is the updated value, which could make sure the 
independence of each sub-network. 
 
Figure 2.   Key negotiation process 
D. Node addition and revocation 
Since the public parameter π has already been stored in 
the ROM of each node, new nodes are entitled secret keys to 
communicate with cluster heads. If a new node needs to be 
added to the network, it ought to register his identity to cluster 
head in the sub-network, which it belongs to. Then the cluster 
head checks the validity and authenticity of the new node 
through communicating with the base station. If this node is 
valid and reliable, cluster head would send the updated public 
parameter and the new node’s new private key to it, using the 
IBE. Once the new node has received and updated the private 
key and public parameter, it negotiate with the cluster head 
to form a communication key. The detail of the key 
negotiation is illustrated in part C, section III. 
If a node needs to be annulled, the cluster head discards 
the corresponding communication key and reports the 
identity of the annulled node to base station. 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
      In this section, the security of our scheme is discussed in 
terms of compromised nodes, the security of the parameter 
exchange protocol and forward security. 
A. Compromised nodes 
Compromised nodes are nodes that are manipulated by 
the adversary through some kind of techniques. A secure 
WSNs scheme should make it difficult or impossible for 
adversary to extract information about other nodes or the 
network through compromised nodes. In our scheme, since 
every node has negotiated a unique and independent key with 
the cluster head, even though the adversary captures some 
sensor nodes, the keys between the cluster head and other 
nodes are still secure. Granted that a cluster head is captured 
by the adversary, the base station can detect the behavior of 
cluster heads and thus find out the comprised nodes. Once a 
cluster head found compromised, the base station designates 
another node to serve as a cluster head. The new cluster head 
regenerates and redistributes sub-network’s public parameter 
and each node’s private key. Since the new cluster head can 
refuse to communicate with the compromised former cluster 
head, the compromised cluster head would be ruled out of the 
network and the adversary can get no further information 
about the network. Furthermore, the adversary is not able to 
get the communication keys between cluster head and sensor 
nodes through analyzing the ciphered text for its difficulty is 
identical to solve the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). In 
addition, acquiring the private keys of nodes is also regarded 
as impossible, since its difficulty is identical to solve the 
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem.  
B. The security of the parameter exchange protocol 
In our scheme, a secrete key is not decided by a single 
party. Instead, it is negotiated through Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange with several advantages of the key agreement 
protocol [11]. In addition, since the exchange parameter of 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange is encrypted by IBE algorithm 
through the receiver’s public key, only the designated user 
can decrypt the message and thus attain an implicit 
authentication. Furthermore, man-in-the-middle attack is not 
practical in our scheme since every parameter is encrypted 
and can only be decrypted by the receiver. 
C. Forward Security 
Forward security means the long time leakage of keys 
from one or more entities could not lead to the leakage of the 
session keys. In our scheme, the cluster head is dynamically 
assigned by the base station rather than changeless. The 
management of each sub-network is also independent. Even 
though the private keys of a sub-network is leaked, through 
the dynamic adjustments of the cluster head, the public 
parameter of the sub-network would be adjusted and thus the 
communication keys between the cluster head and sensor 
nodes would be adjusted. Therefore, even though the private 
keys are leaked, the adversary can only get information in a 
certain region during a limited time span. The information 
transmitted before the former round of key distribution as 
well as after a new round of key distribution is secure. In 
conclusion, our scheme can achieve approximate perfect 
forward security. 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
     In this section, we will discuss the performance of our 
scheme and compare the computation overhead and 
communication overhead with IBEKAS scheme and BNN-
IBS-KS scheme, which is illustrated respectively in [8] and 
[9]. The following analysis and comparison is based on these 
assumptions: 1) there are N sub-networks in a network, 2) 
each sub-network contains M nodes, 3) there are also M 
nodes in the communication range of each node. 
A. Connectivity rate 
According to our scheme, the key agreement between the 
cluster head and sensor nodes or base station is implemented 
through the directional transmission of the encrypted DH key 
exchange parameter, which is encrypted by the receiver’s 
public key. Base station or each nodes can negotiate a 
symmetry key with the cluster head. In addition, the base 
station can cluster the network to make sure the cluster heads 
can cover all the nodes, by analyzing each node’s 
geographical location and communication capacity. Thereby, 
theoretically, our scheme can achieve approximately 100% 
connectivity rate. However, it is very difficult for key pre-
distribution scheme to achieve high connectivity rate due to 
the randomness of the key distribution or the haphazard 
deployment of nodes [6]. 
B. Network Flexibility 
The process of node addition and revocation has been 
discussed in part D, section III. According to IBEKAS 
scheme or BNN-IBS-KS scheme, a new node must conduct 
key agreements between all neighborhood nodes while being 
added to the network. However, in our scheme, only the new 
node itself, the cluster head that rules the region new node 
belongs to and the base station are involved in the process of 
node addition. Other nodes are free from the intervention of 
new node addition and thus the network load is decreased. 
If a certain node needs to be revoked from the network, 
the base station would preserve its identification. Since the 
cluster head must register the new node’s identification to the 
base station before this node is able to join the network, nodes 
that have been revoked is impossible to join the network 
again, which forbids the adversary to use the revoked nodes 
to imitate new nodes. However, there is no mechanism in 
IBEKAS scheme or BNN-IBS-KS scheme to prevent the 
adversary from imitating new nodes with revoked nodes, 
which makes it pretty easy for the adversary to use the 
revoked nodes to endanger network security. 
C. Comunication overhead  
In our scheme, every cluster head negotiates secrete keys 
with base station and each node in its territory. The total 
negotiation times in a sub-network is M+1. However, in 
IBEKAS scheme and BNN-IBS-KS scheme, each node must 
negotiate secrete keys with every nodes in its neighborhood, 
and thus 𝐶𝑀
2 = (𝑀 × (𝑀 − 1)) 2⁄  times key agreements 
must be conducted. The comparison between our scheme and 
IBEKAS, BNN-IBS-KS is illustrated in figure 3. In WSNs, 
energy consumed by wireless transmission is far more than 
the energy consumed by computation [10]. Thus compared to 
IBEKAS and BNN-IBS-KS, our scheme can greatly save the 
energy consumed by wireless transmission. 
(a)communication overhead in our 
scheme
(b)communication overhead in IBEKAS 
and BNN-IBS-KS
Cluster head
Sensor node
 
Figure 3.  Comparison of communication overhead 
D. Computation overhead 
In each sub-network, our scheme requires M+1 times key 
agreement processes. However, IBEKAS and BNN-IBS-KS 
requires (𝑀 × (𝑀 − 1)) 2⁄  times key agreement processes. 
The computation overhead of our scheme, IBEKAS and 
BNN-IBS-KS in a sub-network that contains M nodes is 
described in Table I. 
TABLE I.  COMPUTATION OVERHEAD COMPARISION 
Arithmetic 
Type 
Proposed scheme IBEKAS BNN-IBS-KS 
Encryption Decryption Encryption Decryption Signature Validation 
Bilinear M+1 M+1 𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
  
Hash 2M+2 M+1 𝑀(𝑀 − 1) 𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
𝑀(𝑀 − 1) 
ECC addition M+1  𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
 𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
3𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
ECC 
multiplication 
     𝑀(𝑀 − 1) 
XOR M+1 M+1 𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
  
Exponent M+1  𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
   
      The computation overhead in IBE is mainly from bilinear 
operation and ECC multiplication operation. To simplify 
analysis, we only consider these two operations. In a MICA2 
sensor (8bits, ATmega128L, 8MHz, voltage 3V, current 
8mAh), implementing an ECC multiplication operation 
requires 0.81s and 19.44mJ energy. Implementing a bilinear 
operation requires 3.102s and 74.45mJ energy [6]. In a sub-
network with M nodes, the computation time and energy 
consumption is illustrated in table 2. 
TABLE II.  COMPUTATION TIME AND ENERGY CONSUMPTION 
Scheme Time (s) Energy (mJ) 
Proposed 
scheme 
(0.81 + 3.102 × 2) × 𝑀 (19.44 + 74.45 × 2) × 𝑀 
IBEKAS (0.81 + 3.102 × 2)
×
𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
(19.44 + 74.45 × 2)
×
𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
 
BNN-
IBS-KS 0.81 × (
3𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
+ 1) 19.44 × (
3𝑀(𝑀 − 1)
2
+ 1) 
     With different nodes in a sub-network, the computation 
time and energy of the three schemes is presented in figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Computation time and energy consumption 
     According to the comparison in figure 4. It is clear that, 
compared to IBEKAS or BNN-IBS-KS, our scheme 
dramatically decreases the computation time and energy 
consumption through the decrease of negotiation times, 
which is critical for WSNs with limited computation 
resources and energy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a scheme to manage distributed flat 
WSNs in a hierarchical way. This scheme not only solves the 
large consumption in communication and computation 
confronted by traditional distributed flat WSNs, but also 
serves as an effective method to prevent the adversary from 
using the compromised nodes to threaten the entire network. 
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